On 14th Ramadan (24/08/10) at iftar time there occurred a bloody encounter in Beirut, as skirmishes broke out between supporters of Hizbullah and the so-called al-Ahbash or Charitable Projects Association. The incident was said to be isolated and caused by a ‘parking space’ belonging to Group I (Hizbullah) near a masjid dominated by Group II (al-Ahbash).
بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم
On 14th Ramadan (24/08/10) at iftar time there occurred a bloody encounter in Beirut, as skirmishes broke out between supporters of Hizbullah and the so-called al-Ahbash or Charitable Projects Association. The incident was said to be isolated and caused by a ‘parking space’ belonging to Group I (Hizbullah) near a masjid dominated by Group II (al-Ahbash). Three people associated with Group I were killed, among them a local leader of Hizbullah, and one person from Group II was killed. The skirmishes continued for three hours stretching into more than one neighbourhood. The army later stepped in to stop the fighting.
Both these groups are considered to be linked to one alliance with Syria. It is not possible that this is an isolated incident that simply turned into a major clash in which lives were so easily lost, property destroyed and it persisted for hours between two groups from the one alliance, except if there was a preplanned intent for something to occur. Particularly given that the second group have not partaken in armed conflict with anyone before, and now dare to attack Hizbullah, who is considered the strongest armed group in Lebanon, and who engaged the Jewish enemy and was considered victorious in being able to stand firm in face of the enemy, cause heavy damage and prevent occupation. Group I seems surprised by this audacious attack and appeared to not expect such a thing to occur from a group considered to stand in its alliance. The attack was also timed to coincide with the time of iftar, and whilst the leader of Hizbullah Hassan Nasrallah was delivering a speech away from politics. Thus Hizbullah was taken by surprise and was unable to respond effectively. This indicates planning behind the incident.
We have seen that a delegation of Group II (Charitable projects) immediately visited Syria to meet Rustum Ghazal who was in charge of Syrian intelligence in Lebanon until the withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon in 2005 following the assassination of Hariri and the accusation that Syria was behind the assassination. On the contrary no delegation from Hizbullah went to meet with Syrian officials, which indicates that the relationship of Hizbullah with the Syrian regime seems lukewarm and that Hizbullah feels that something is being planned against it.
Sad al-Hariri inspected the premises of Group II and expressed his sympathy for them and appeared to be siding with them, a matter which troubled Group I and was seen as a striking bias, as he also began igniting a campaign against Hizbullah. Hariri and the so-called ‘March 14‘ group have begun to exploit this incident – which has come to be known as the Burj Abu Haidar incident – and to call for a disarmament of Beirut and the whole of Lebanon. This demand is an old one that has been renewed, and it is the same demand stipulated by Security Council Resolution 1559, issued in 2006. A ministerial committee was then formed to look into the issue of weapons, whether they were to be ‘seized or collected‘. They started paving the way to create public opinion in favour of disarming Beirut by using the slogan of ‘Beirut disarmed’ on grounds of what occurred against Syria after the assassination of Hariri in 2005 which forced Syria to withdraw from Lebanon. They wanted the same to happen against Hizbullah and its weapons so that Hizbullah would submit to the hypothetical decision of the International Tribunal expected to be delivered in the coming months and in which it is expected that elements of Hizbullah will be accused.
On the night of 29-30/08/2010 Syrian president Bashar al-Asad summoned Lebanese president Sa‘d al-Hariri. After the meeting and al-Hariri‘s return to Beirut, and Bashar al-Asad said we, “need to continue in the approach of deliberation and dialogue to resolve outstanding issues and to promote national reconciliation and to support the resistance” as mentioned in an official statement issued in Lebanon after the meeting. After all this, it has been noticed that the campaign charging the atmosphere against Hizbullah and its weapons through the slogan of ‘Beirut disarmed’ was discontinued, and al-Hariri did not return to speak on this issue. His tone changed to one of reconciliation and deliberation. Similarly the voices of the ministerial committee charged with finding a solution to the phenomenon of weapons being common amongst citizens was toned down.
From all this it appears that Syria pushed the so-called al-Ahbash to carry out this act in order for Syria to show Hizbullah that it still has power in Lebanon that can be relied upon, so that Hizbullah should submit to the dictates of Syria and to accept what is issued by the International Tribunal. It is as if Syria intended that this incident be limited to the equivalent of waving a stick. Thus did the Ahbash delegation immediately visit Rustum Ghazal “who as it seems still leads strategic actions for Syria in Lebanon” in order for the delegation to report on what Ahbash had achieved in their mission, which would also indicate a Syrian hand in the matter.
It was also mentioned that members of another organization calling themselves Ahl al-Sunnah partook in the clashes, and tried to highlight the matter as a Sunni-Shi’a clash, in order to exploit this evil incident in the best way to start a campaign against Hizbullah. Some ex-prisoners were led to burn a mosque considered to belong to the Ahbash in order to add fuel to the fire.
It is also understood from Bashar’s summoning al-Hariri to Damascus at night, the subsequent official announcements of reconciliation from al-Hariri, the discontinuation of the ‘Beirut disarmed’ slogan and the campaign against Hizbullah, the effective dissolution of the ministerial committee. It is understood from all this that Syria did not intend escalation against Hizbullah and its weapons, or to give up on Hizbullah or to disarm it at present. It only intended to wave the stick in Hizbullah’s face and to pressurise it to submit to its demands. This is why Syria did not accept for Hariri and his party to pursue their objectives against Hizbullah and its weapons, for this would cause harm to Syria and strengthen Hariri’s party, which would weaken Syria’s allies in Lebanon, and in turn its influence and power in Lebanon. It is possible that Hariri’s party, the so-called March 14 group, will renege from its position and end reconciliation when it sees that it can succeed in its campaign against Hizbullah. This group is still not secured as far as Syria is concerned.
The process of reconciliation between Hizbullah and the Charitable Projects Association has begun. This is to contain the issue and prevent others from exploiting it, and because Syria is content for now with what it achieved though it with regards to Hizbullah. It is also apparent that Hizbullah has moved away from threats and intimidation by repeating May 7. It has not used the incident to carry out any of its threats, even though one leader and two members of it were killed. This is not something small, for it in is a degree of humiliation, which indicates that Hizbullah understood the lesson, knows where the hit came from and understands the intent behind it, which is the warning from Syria that if you persist then the like of this worse will occur.
Further, it is as though the state in Lebanon was aware of this, and thus did not intervene the army except until the end of the clashes to stop them only after it was instructed that that is sufficient some parties even accused the state of negligence, indirectly accusing the state of complicity.
21 Ramadan 1431 AH
31 August 2010 CE