To the political mind, armed conflict is not just a clash of material resources rather of political wills. Whether the armed conflict was for ideological reasons or imperial or economic objectives material resources alone are not the only determinant of winners and losers. Moreover a conflict may be lost materially and won politically and vice versa. It is therefore not surprising that states, when entering in to conflicts, do not just focus on material resources rather deploy political means to win conflicts.
It is therefore necessary to analyze the Afghan War in this context. Long wars have a tendency of suffering from continuously changing narratives which cloud and often confuse the judgment of the masses as to why a war is being fought and which party has the high moral standing and just cause and hence the political support of the masses. Sometimes political support also comes for expedient reasons, however in such a scenario as soon as the reason for expediency disappears, political support wanes. As for the changing narratives, they change because the states or the warring parties continuously try to keep the political support of the masses behind them. For no state can afford to enter a war and expect to win it without the support of the local populace. These changing narratives are sometimes clear and explicit and sometimes contradictory and confusing. The aim of war narratives is never to present the narrative correctly rather to present a narrative which will win the political support of the masses. It may be that a narrative wins political support for the war temporarily but becomes obsolete as the economic and material costs of the war increase or some political parties and movements are able to propagate a counter narrative which is much more powerful than the one currently peddled out by the state. In such a scenario of changing narratives, it is generally the original narrative at the start of the conflict which can be considered as the most accurate.
For the Muslims of the region, the Afghan War was one war being fought by the Muslims of Afghanistan and Pakistan, mainly the Pashtun tribes on both sides of the Durand Line, against the American occupation of Afghanistan. America entered the Afghan War relying on the support network of regional countries like Pakistan, Iran, India and some Central Asian states with Pakistan being the front line state in the war effort. The strong and overwhelmingly Pashtun dominated resistance to American occupation of Afghanistan narrowed the war between America and Pashtun insurgents in the border areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan where America sensed that the resistance to American occupation in Afghanistan cannot be subdued without subduing the Pashtun tribes both in Afghanistan as well as Pakistan. This led to the operational strategy of viewing the Afghan war theatre as a single theatre although it spread across two countries. Hence, the term “Af-Pak” was coined to refer to the war against Pashtun tribes on both sides of the Durand Line. This was the operational aspect of the American war strategy.
As for the political strategy, America faced stiff resistance from the Pakistani populace who was and remains fiercely opposed to American occupation of Afghanistan. This fierce political opposition complicated American war strategy as it relied upon using the Pakistani military to target the Pashtun tribes on the Pakistani side of the Durand Line while American and Afghan Security Forces would target the Pashtun tribes on the Afghan Side of the Durand line. When the Pakistani populace refused to lend political support for its army to deploy in the tribal areas for stopping the native Pashtun tribes from helping the insurgency across the border, America decided to change its political strategy for the Afghan War.
Initially the Musharraf regime presented the Afghan War as an American war in which Pakistan had no choice but to support the mighty super power or face American military and economic wrath. Such an expedient narrative helped Musharraf subdue opposition to Pakistani State’s support for the Afghan War. However, with all expedient narratives this narrative lost political support in Pakistan as soon as it became clear that American military capability is exaggerated, especially after the humiliation which America faced in Iraq. To conjure political support for its war effort in Afghanistan and find an excuse for the deployment of Pakistani military in the tribal areas, America changed the political narrative of the Afghan War from one war to two wars.
In this narrative, one war was being fought between America and the Pashtun insurgents in Afghanistan and the other war was to be fought between Pakistani state and the Pashtun tribes in FATA region. To operationalize this strategy, America instigated a war between the Pakistani military and Pashtun tribes residing within Pakistan. This new policy was put in to practice by the support of the Musharraf regime and came in to effect with the highly publicized siege and subsequent military operation against the administration of Islamabad’s Red Mosque. The bloodshed in the Red Mosque infuriated the Pashtun tribes. Using the animosity generated from the Red Mosque Operation, American intelligence network started a campaign of bomb blasts across urban Pakistan targeting the security apparatus and civilian populations. These false flag attacks were used to instigate the war between Pakistani military and Pashtun tribes; and helped create the perception of a second war. From the womb of the Afghan War between America and the insurgents in Afghanistan came the second war between Pakistan Army and the insurgents residing in Pakistan, midwifed and sustained by American intelligence or the Raymond Davis Network.
It is this second war which was supposed to provide America the political support and cover for the first war. So the new narrative is that the Pakistani military is deployed in the FATA region to fight a home grown insurgency while in fact America needs Pakistani military in FATA to cut off the support the native Pashtun tribes are providing to the Afghan insurgency. This is America’s strategic deception, of making two wars out of one. By perpetuating a misleading war narrative in Pakistan, America is trying to fool the Pakistani public and political medium on concentrating on the war between the Pakistani State and Pashtun tribes, a war sustained by the continuous instigation of America intelligence. Such a narrative serves the dual purpose of listing the military support of Pakistani state for American war effort in Afghanistan as well as implementing the new American policy of outsourcing the War on Terror to regional countries. As America pulls out majority of its troops from Afghanistan without defeating the insurgency, it requires the services of Afghanistan and Pakistan’s militaries to continue the war effort on its behalf. Such a policy requires that a local narrative, independent of America, is present to help continue counter terrorism operations against the insurgents.
The Afghan war remains one war, that of America occupying Afghanistan for the purpose of establishing permanent military bases for power projection in the region. America executed the strategic policy of making two wars out of one war to protect and consolidate its military, intelligence, diplomatic and political presence in the region. This region will not see peace and security unless the political medium in Pakistan views the Afghan War as One War, a war of occupation of Afghanistan which must be ended by targeting the complete eradication of American military, intelligence, diplomatic and political presence in the region.
Written for the Central Media Office of Hizb ut Tahrir by
Moez Mobeen / Pakistan