Question: It has been more than a year now since local and international media has been consistently reporting a clash between the United States and the Pakistani military. It started with the Raymond Davis issue, followed by the attack on Abottabad raid to kill Osama bin Laden and finally we had the closure of NATO supply lines after the Salala border attack by ISAF forces.
Is the clash between Pakistani Army and America genuine? What exactly is the clash about? Is it true to say that the Pakistani military is frustrating American plans of withdrawal from the region so that it can bargain a greater role for herself in Afghanistan, once majority of the NATO troops leave Afghanistan? Is it true that Pakistan and America have a difference of opinion over the issue of how to deal with the Haqqani network? Is Pakistan protecting the Haqqani network from American attacks?
Answer:
1. It is imperative to understand that the military in Pakistan is the most important institution of the country and relations between it and the US span several years. During this period the military has undergone many changes and the most dramatic of these changes occurred during the era of Zia-ul-Haq. Under Zia’s command the military was Islamicized to support America’s proxy war against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. The changes introduced by Zia have left a strong impression on the military, especially its army cadres. This is in addition to the nationalist and the secularist elements in the army.
2. When Pervez Musharraf became Chief of Army Staff (COAS) he had to contend with these three factions, he however paid more attention to the Islamists. After September 11, 2001, America reversed its policy of Islamicization of Pakistan and in collusion with Musharraf began to de-Islamicize the army, Pakistani society and other institutions (educational establishments, madrasas etc). Musharraf hounded the Islamists in the army. He sought early retirement of some, others he deployed to far afield posts and a few he court martialled. He also changed the curriculum to give it a new secular emphasis and promoted likeminded secularists to important positions.
3. Not only was Musharraf unsuccessful at eradicating the influence of the Islamic minded officers, he also failed to change the military concepts related to Pakistan’s security, especially defending Pakistan against India and having a Pushtun friendly government in Afghanistan. Such ideas also find strong support amongst the nationalists and it has become difficult for any COAS – no matter how loyal he is to the US – to suppress these traits within the army.
Therefore, it was necessary for the Chief of Army Staff to appear as if he has some dispute with the United States. This is to appear as if what he wants to implement is in the interests of Pakistan and not in the interest of America. That is to counter the stance of those who oppose and are averse to following the United States, regardless of the extent to which its instructions are implemented by the Chief of Army Staff in his personal capacity.
4. As for what appeared to be a crisis between the US military and Pakistan; Kayani is no different to his predecessors, and is exposed to the same institutional constraints placed by the army, as well as the tough American demands placed on his shoulders. This often means that he has to tread carefully between the two opposing forces to ensure that America’s demands are met. However, the Abbottabad raid by US forces and the killing of Pakistani soldiers in Salala by NATO forces has made it even harder for him to execute American demands. His credibility has been severely dented both within the armed forces and the Pakistani public. The arrest of Brigadier Ali Khan epitomised the internal resistance Kayani faced.
5. In order to assuage such concerns, Kayani chose to delay the North Waziristan operation and also refused to reopen the NATO supply lines. His action was met with a barrage of complaints and threats from US officials. The US Defence Secretary had harsh words for Pakistan. He said, “We are reaching the limits of our patience here. It is difficult to achieve peace in Afghanistan as long as there is safe haven for terrorists in Pakistan. It is very important for Pakistan to take steps. It is an increasing concern, the issue of safe haven.”
6. In the end, the Pakistani leadership capitulated to US demands to reopen NATO supply lines. On 1st July 2012, talks took place between American officials and Pakistani officials in Islamabad that led to re-opening of the supply lines in return for an apology from the US Secretary of State Hilary Clinton. The US side was represented by Deputy Secretary of State Thomas Nides, ISAF Commander, General John Allen, and US Ambassador, Cameron Munter, whereas the Pakistani side included Kayani and Foreign Minister, Hina Rabbani Khar, amongst others. The Pakistani leadership, once again emerged as losers.
7. As for what appeared from Kayani of silence over the Haqqani network, it is not outside of what we have mentioned previously, which is that in order to implement American instructions, Kayani appears as if he is opposed to America. To elaborate we bring the following for consideration:
a. Kayani established strikes upon Taliban and the tribal frontier areas
b. American drone aircraft mounted rocket attacks against the mujahideen in the border areas and beyond them
These two matters raised resentment in Pakistani society against Kayani and the military institution. So the apparent silence of Kayani over the Haqqani network is through fear of the resentment of the people, particularly since the Haqqani network is within common knowledge in its regions. Despite this Kayani did not allow the network to mount any effective or sustained attacks across the borders and urged America to pursue the mujahideen across the border. So, in the joint meeting between Kayani and General John Allen, Kayani raised the issue of storming the militants, such that the spokesman for the military said: “We raised the issue of cross border attacks from Afghanistan upon the military institution within Pakistan and requested ISAF to mount operations against safe havens for extremists in Afghanistan and elimination of militant groups participating in cross border attacks within Pakistan.” And this is all that Kayani is doing, whilst deceiving the people that he is supporting the Haqqani network.
25 Shaaban 1433 AH
15/07/2012