The following is an extract from the forthcoming Khilafah.com publication – Strategic Estimate 2014. It analyses the Arab Spring on its third anniversary.
Strategic Estimate concluded its assessment of the Arab spring at the end of 2012 with the following:
“……aside from the Syrian uprising the others that took place have all ground to a halt as those who espoused Islam are in reality maintaining the pre-revolutionary systems. They are attempting to keep the West happy with their moderation and the people that voted them in, happy, by making cosmetic changes, whilst all the while keeping in place the secular systems and protecting Western interests.”
The Arab spring reached its third anniversary at the end of 2013. The euphoria that captured the world and stunned many, as previously unshakable dictators, who ruled for decades began falling one after the other. This has now given way to the reality of self-rule and the challenges this brings. The most influential regime in the Middle East – Egypt successfully navigated the Arab spring, but this was short lives as power fell in Egypt as the Muslim brotherhood (MB) was overthrown by the military. In the other countries the groups who took power continue to evolve and navigate the myriad of challenges.
Egypt
In the Strategic Estimate 2013 we concluded the situation in Egypt as the follows:
“The system the army constructed that enshrined US interests and protected the state of Israel simply has a new manager. Whilst many came onto the streets demanding change, the faces have changed, but the underlying system remains firmly in place in the country.”
The rule of the Muslim Brotherhood’s (MB) Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), since the swearing in of Muhammad Morsi as president in June 2012 was anything but stable. Problems began as soon as Morsi won the presidential elections. The result was delayed which indicated something was taking place behind the scenes. Egypt has been a central player in protecting US interests in the region and protecting Israel through its 1979 peace treaty. A US ambassador confirmed what took place: “The United States is committed to the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel and considers it crucial for peace and stability in the region, and for the prosperity of the people of Egypt and Israel in the first place. We also consider this treaty the foundation for peace-making efforts and stability in the whole region. We are of course pleased that the Government of Egypt has repeatedly expressed that it would honour all Egypt’s international obligations. We encourage Egypt and Israel to continue their direct discussions over the security situation in the Sinai and other issues of common interest; and we affirm that security in the Sinai is the most important first and foremost.”
Morsi sent a communiqué confirming Egypt’s commitment to peaceful ties with Israel. In a letter sent to Shimon Peres, President of Israel, Morsi said: “I am looking forward to exerting our best efforts to get the Middle East Peace Process back to its right track in order to achieve security and stability for all peoples of the region, including that Israeli people.” Despite vociferous denials by Morsi’s representatives, the letter turned out to be genuine. The UK’s Guardian reported that Peres’s office said the president’s aides received the official communiqué on July 31st 2012 from the Egyptian ambassador to the Jewish state, both by registered mail and by fax from the Egyptian embassy in Tel Aviv. Furthermore, the paper stated that the fax number which appeared on the faxed letter was registered to the Egyptian embassy in Tel Aviv.
Throughout the one year rule of Morsi the domestic political scene was never stable and was worsened by the confusion brought about by the Morsi government over decision-making. Morsi constantly retracted his decisions under pressure. Morsi made many random and arbitrary decisions without any consultation with others. None of the government policies were tested on the street; neither did Morsi attempt to convince the public of his policies. Morsi’s rule was characterised with anarchy and this instability continued throughout his year in office, which led to the emergence of a growing opposition, which challenged his rule. Morsi’s arbitrary rule can be seen from the following:
• Morsi’s first decision on 8 July 2012, was cancelling the Constitutional Court’s ruling to dissolve parliament, and calling parliament back based on his presidential decree. Two days later, Morsi changed his mind and decided not to challenge the court, backing down from reconvening parliament after the court dissolved it again.
• In October 2012 Morsi backed down on an earlier decision to remove the country’s top prosecutor Abdel-Maguid Mahmoud, keeping him in his post and sidestepping a potential clash with the country’s powerful judiciary. The standoff escalated with a backlash from a powerful group of judges who said Morsi’s move had infringed upon their authority and on the judiciary’s independence.
• In November 2012 Morsi issued a declaration immunizing his decrees. The move led to massive protests and violent action throughout Egypt. By December 2012 Morsi back tracked on the declaration.
The Morsi government inherited an economy which was already on the verge of collapse. The lack of a clear economic roadmap made the economic situation worse. The problem with the Egyptian economy was that an elite few were in control of it. When large parts of the economy were privatized, the country’s assets went right into the hands of Mubarak’s friends. These business tycoons still maintained control over the Egyptian economy, something Morsi never attempted to change. This misdistribution led to a situation where 40% of Egyptian population were living below the poverty line. These big business elites moved much of their wealth out of the country when Mubarak fell, leading to a big fall of the Egyptian pound, drastically raising the cost of imports. Since Egypt is reliant upon agricultural and energy imports, this created a massive trade imbalance and lead to Morsi’s decision to turn to the IMF. As inflation spiralled out of control and unemployment rose many took to the streets in protest.
Morsi failed to placate much of the opposition, who took every opportunity to undermine his rule. The secular opposition, Mubarak-era officials, and the business elite never accepted the MB electoral victory, their key demand had always been that Morsi must step down. Morsi had to contend with persistent insurrection in power since coming to power, and Morsi attempted to deal with this by sacking the prosecutor general Abdel-Maguid Mahmoud and assigning himself powers over the legislative and executive branches as well as immunity from the courts. This backfired, leading to mass riots and stand-off in the streets of Cairo. Morsi failed to integrate the opposition, divide them, or weaken them. As a result, opposition figures carried out regular, often violent, demonstrations to undermine Morsi’s rule, bringing the country to a standstill.
The Morsi regime was plagued with indecisiveness and the inability to deal with pressing problems as it lacked a grand vision. The MB went to great lengths to demonstrate its moderation to the West. In its rush to placate so-called international opinion, they abandoned all commitment to Islamic governance. When it came to applying Islamic principles they cited constitutional barriers and the need to keep minorities onside. When it came to applying Islamic economics, they cited the need to avoid scaring international investors and tourists. When it came to applying the Islamic foreign policy, they cited the need to show a moderate image and to appease the West. Slogans such as ‘Islam is the solution,’ were very quickly replaced with a call for a civil state. The initial calls for Islam were completely removed from Morsi’s statements as he settled into power.
The MB showed a lack political awareness by entering a political process which was established by Gamal Abdul Nasser and which the army maintained. The army’s interference in the running of the country and disproportionate influence weakened the President. The army, since the ouster of Mubarak, allowed the day-to-day running of the country to remain in the hands of the government, but kept foreign policy firmly within its own hands. The minister of defence is always the head of the army in Egypt. Any policy, such as the defence budget that could affect the army’s position were always overruled. As a result, the MB had to toe the army’s line, giving up whatever plans it had on its own agenda. Rather than attempting to challenge the political system in Egypt with the electoral mandate it received, the MB abandoned whatever it stood for.
Despite compromising on everything, it was never enough for the secular elements, who wished to emerge victorious from their demonstrations. Despite over 80 years touting ‘Islam is the solution,’ when the opportunity presented itself the MB failed to meet the challenge governance posed. As a result, despite winning the elections, they were always on the back-foot defending their rule.
By July 2013, Morsi’s first anniversary as President, he had inflamed the public by maintaining the pre-revolutionary system. He increasingly became isolated and authoritarian – reminiscent of the Mubarak days. The fragmented opposition capitalised on this groundswell of anti-Morsi feeling, which in a short space of time had captured the hearts and minds of secular Egyptians as well as the vast majority of practicing Muslims. It was the latter segment that had propelled Morsi’s Freedom and Justice Party to the fore of Egyptian politics only a year earlier. Now this segment had turned against him and called for his removal.
On 3rd July 2013, after being given 24 hours to sort out the crisis by the head of the army, army commandos came to take Morsi to an undisclosed Defense Ministry facility – effectively a coup. Even his Republican Guards simply stepped away as the Muslim Brotherhood joined the likes of Mubarak, Ben Ali, Saleh and Gaddafi – rulers overthrown due to the euphoria of the Arab spring. The situation in Egypt returned to the eve of Mubarak’s overthrow, the army was back in power, Mubarak era cronies were also back in key positions and the opposition who posed any challenge to military rule were incarcerated. The Egyptian military under Sisi has worked to completely destroy the MB and every possible threat to their power in order to maintain its role in the country. Soldiers and police opened fire on hundreds of Morsi supporters that gathered in Cairo in numerous protests, hundreds of people were killed in what Human Rights Watch described as “the most serious incident of mass unlawful killings in modern Egyptian history.” Throughout August 2013 MB members camped out for days in front of the Rabaa mosque in Cairo, protesting the military’s ouster of Morsi. On August 14 2013, wearing riot gear and driving armoured vehicles and bulldozers, the security forces moved in, killing at least 600 people and wounding thousands more. The attack, aided by snipers, lasted for more than 12 hours. Following this the interim president, returned Egypt to martial law. If that was not enough an Egyptian court released Hosni Mubarak from prison too. A Kangaroo court was set up where Morsi and other MB members stood trial for “committing acts of violence and inciting killing and thuggery.”
Syria
Strategic Estimate 2013, summed up the situation in Syria as:
“The Ummah in Syria after decades of oppression have stood tall even after a brutal crackdown by the Al – Assad regime. For the moment the struggle for Syria stands at various powers manoeuvring in order to gain influence in this strategic country. The situation in the country is still fluid and could potentially go in any direction. The Ummah’s challenge in Syria is to not be lured with promises of weapons by foreign powers and compromise with their uprising.”
Throughout 2013 the Ummah in Syria have been able to maintain the purity of their uprising despite the many attempts by foreign powers to hijack their demand for Islam and their attempts to infiltrate the rebel groups.
In May 2013, the al-Assad regime was on the verge of collapse. This led to the intervention of Iran and thousands of fighters from Hizbollah. Because of this Bashar al-Assad achieved one of his most important military victories in the past two years by forcing the withdrawal of opposition forces from the town of al-Qusayr. The town located in Homs province, an area central to the success of Assad’s overall military strategy. The fall of al-Qusayr effectively altered the balance of power on the ground and served as a critical turning point in the war. This is because it is a critical junction that linked Damascus to Latakia and the Mediterranean coast. From this success the regime launched multiple counter offensives in Homs, however the regime had to consolidate resources and reinforcements in Homs province, and diverted its attention from important opposition advances, particularly in Damascus. This eventually allowed the rebel groups to make a comeback.
This desperation is one of the key reasons Bashar al-Assad launched his largest chemical attack yet.
This was confirmed In “a telephone call intercepted by German spy chiefs, a senior Hezbollah commander told the Iranian embassy in Lebanon that Bashar Al-Assad launched the chemical attack which killed hundreds of people because he ‘lost his nerve’ in a moment of panic and worried that Damascus would fall to rebel troops.” He continued further, “that Syria’s president intended to tilt the balance of power towards the regime in the battle for control of the country’s capital.”
America’s dithering on this Chemical attack and eventual failure to launch a military strike made it completely clear which side it was on. Al-Assad’s chemical attack in the Eastern suburbs of his own capital, showed how far the rebels have come in overthrowing the regime. After initially moving its ships into the Mediterranean and after Britain’s parliament refused to participate in any intervention, Obama placed the decision to intervene before the US congress, even though as commander in chief, he did not need to. Obama was able to utilise Russia in a deal that saw Syria give up its chemical weapons instead of military intervention. This episode was completely in sync with US attempts to keep as much of the regime in place until an alternative could be found.
The Geneva talks have been organised by the West for the Syrian National Coalition to negotiate with the al-Assad regime and agree a compromise at the expense of the demands of the people. These talks represented the Western position of maintaining the regime at all costs and having the rebel groups compromise their position on the regimes removal. Leon Panetta, in an interview with the CNN in July 2012, said: “I think it’s important when Assad leaves – and he will leave – to try to preserve stability in that country. And the best way to preserve that kind of stability is to maintain as much of the military, the police, as you can, along with the security forces, and hope that they will transition to a democratic form of government. That’s a key.” John Kerry, US secretary of state, made it clear after al-Assad used chemical weapons in East Damascus that any intervention is not about regime change, A white house official confirmed: “The White House wants to strengthen the opposition but doesn’t want it to prevail, according to people who attended closed-door briefings by top administration officials over the past week. The administration doesn’t want U.S. airstrikes, for example, tipping the balance of the conflict because it fears Islamists will fill the void if the Assad regime falls.”
The announcement of a new coalition based on Islam in September 2013 which included the 11 largest groups in Syria shows the rebels are pooling their resources together and consolidating their positions as they home in on Damascus. The Islamic nature of the uprising was confirmed by many of the factions that have a stake in the country. In late June 2013, Al-Jazeera aired a series of interviews (in Arabic) with leaders of the main armed factions fighting against the al-Assad regime in Syria. Six interviews in total were conducted by Al-Jazeera correspondent Tayseer Allouni, a native Syrian who gained international fame for his exclusive interview with Al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden following the attacks of September 11, 2001.The importance of these interviews is in the fact that the world hadn’t heard much of the views of field commanders or actual fighters on the ground. The interviews showed a unique perspective from inside the Syrian revolution rarely portrayed in the media. Many attitudes displayed Islamic sentiments held amongst the majority of the rebels, and the desire to have a future Syria that is independent of Western interference or influence. Most important of all was the unanimous rejection of any negotiations with any elements from the regime of al-Assad, a stark divergence from the “flexible” attitudes expressed by “representatives” of the revolution based outside of Syria.
The regime has lost almost all of the north of the country, the countryside as some southern areas. Today the strategic balance is shifting in the battle between the regime and the rebel groups and it is in this context the US is forcing the rebel groups into negotiations with the regime.
Libya
In Strategic Estimate 2013, we encapsulated Libya’s situation:
“Libya after the ouster of Gaddafi remains in a state of flux, with both the NTC and its successor the GNC governments having little central authority.”
The kidnapping and eventual release of Libya’s Prime Minister Ali Zeidan on October 10 2013 by regime security forces shows that 2 years since the demise of Gaddafi security remains an issue. Libya in 2013 is mired in chaos, militia violence stalks the land, strikes threaten to cripple the oil industry, violence is on the rise in the East and economic stagnation is everywhere.
It took around 8 months for the rebels and various groups in Libya with significant NATO help to bring down the Gaddafi regime. The war had been long and damaging, the wounds deep and what united all the rebel groups was there opposition to Gaddafi. There was never any plan, blueprint or roadmap of what they would do once the Gaddafi regime fell – this is understandable considering the grip Gaddafi maintained for decades. An unelected interim government, the National Transitional Council (NTC) issued a constitutional declaration, otherwise known as the Road Map, which envisaged a lengthy, 18-month transition to something representative of the people. Stage one was the election of a transitional parliament; Stage Two, parliament’s supervision of a new constitution. Once that was adopted, by referendum, Libya would successfully have navigated the Arab spring and transitioned to rule that was representative of the people.
The collapse of regime created a political vacuum as Gaddafi controlled every aspect of Libyan society. Britain and France attempted to fill this huge political landscape with an internationally recognized central government, but this led to the emergence of local and tribal groups to complete with the central authority in Tripoli. Local city councils and militia groups filled the void as the central authority plagued by differences and incompetence struggled to agree on pretty much anything. Today Libya is becoming more and more divided into regions, with little power in the centre. Libya’s revolution was one of the periphery against the center. It was led by the militias of Benghazi, Misrata, and Zintan, and ended not with Tripoli rising up, but with the city being captured by those militias, aided by NATO bombings. Those militias and the communities that spawned them, continue to resist attempts to give up power to the central government. The basic problem that has split Libya into regions was encapsulated by one analyst: “It is important to understand a basic problem, the government blames the militias for still clinging to their weapons whilst the militias accuse Congress and the government of allowing former regime figures to get back into power.”
Libya boasts the largest oil reserves in Africa, plus huge deposits of natural gas and $168 billion in foreign assets – all for a population of a mere 6 million. However the central authority facing a myriad of problems has failed to increase oil production. Local militias control important oil export infrastructure and have proved themselves capable of taking over vital infrastructure such as airports to exact demands from the central government. With the central government failing to ensure security and falling short on promises to pay salaries to the militias, Western oil companies began to deal directly with the militias, local oil companies and regional civilian leaders to conduct day-to-day business. A number sources have confirmed that Western oil companies have hired local militias, specifically the Zintan militia, to protect south-western oil fields from Tuaregs.
The major development in 2013 was Libya’s attempt at drafting a constitution. The cornerstone of the reform process, has failed to materialize, with politicians deadlocked both over the role of Sharia law and bitter regional rivalries. Inside congress, lawmakers have remained bogged-down over how to structure a 60-member-strong commission that was to write the constitution. A number of minority ethnic groups continue to call for a boycott of the popular vote that will be needed to institutionalize the new constitution. The Amazigh, Tibu and Tuareg ethnic groups worry that because the writing of the constitution will be based on the vote of the majority and not on the 60-member group agreeing, they, with only a few seats, are likely to be consistently outvoted. The process of writing the constitution is based around incorporating the interests of all the groups rather than developing an identity that will unite them all.
Despite suffering under the brutal rule of Gaddafi for decades the people of Libya still face immense challenges in the post-Gaddafi landscape. This has been all the more complicated by foreign interference by France and Britain who have their eyes on Libya’s energy wealth. The role of Islam continues to play a major role in the future of the country, despite opposition by some quarters, who believe this will scare international investors and the international community. On the second anniversary of the fall of Gaddafi and on the third anniversary of the Arab spring Libya remains work in progress as the ummah works to take its destiny into its own hands.
Tunisia
In Strategic Estimate 2013, our position on the Arab Spring on Tunisia was:
“The Ummah of Tunisia voted in the Islamic party due to their Islamic sentiments. Ennahda have made it perfectly clear now they are in power, that they have no plans to implement Islam. Tunisia has been the only country that witnessed the ousting of its leader and openly declare that it will maintain the existing system, albeit with some cosmetic changes, but Islam will play virtually no role.”
Throughout 2013 Ennahda has struggled to rule in any meaningful manner. When Ennahda won 89 out of 217 seats in Tunisia’s National Constituent Assembly in October 2011, it was forced to form a coalition with groups who were secular and opposed to it, such the secular Congress for the Republic and Ettakatol party. By not winning a majority Ennahda continued to insist it was not interested in implementing Islam and wants to govern within a democratic framework.
Already having abandoned Islam, matters reached boiling point in February 2013 when Chokri Belaid, a prominent secular opposition leader was assassinated. This triggered mass protests and riots across Tunisia. Already struggling to rule the killing of opposition lawmaker Mohammed Brahmi in July 2013 led to political chaos.
Ennahda has continued with a strategy of appeasement in the hope of maintaining some semblance of credibility. Ennahda’s Prime Minister Hamadi Jebali resigned in February 2013 in response to the political fallout from the assassination of Chokri Belaid. He refused to continue serving as prime minster even after Ennahda tried to nominate him for the post. Jebali proposed a plan that previously had support from the opposition: the appointment of a technocratic Cabinet to guide the Tunisian government forward until the constitution could be written and elections held. Jebali’s own party and the opposition both rejected the proposal. After two years in position Tunisia’s Constituent Assembly is back at step one, having made little progress in writing a constitution under which legitimate elections could be held.
This proves Ennahda is also divided about how best to govern the country. 56 of the 89 members of the party in the Constituent Assembly voted against Jebali’s proposal for a technocratic government. Ennahda’s internal discord is one of the primary factors contributing to the political deadlock.
Yemen
The uprising in Yemen erupted simultaneously with Tunisia and Egypt. Ali Abdullah Saleh had been in power for 33 years and had rid himself of all opposition. Even a near-successful assassination attempt in June 2011, when an improvised explosive device (IED) exploded in the presidential compound mosque, couldn’t force Saleh from power. However with intense pressure from the US to step down and transfer power an agreement was carved out between the EU, US, GCC and Saleh in February 2012 and power transferred to vice president Abd Rabboh Mansour Hadi.
Even though Saleh formally stepped down as president and elections took place in February 2012 (Hadi – was the only candidate) the political transition in Yemen in no way constituted regime change. The deal between the US, EU and Saleh merely gave Saleh a dignified exit. Ever since the power-transfer agreement was signed, and despite regular protests demanding that Saleh be stripped of his immunity and that he and his family face trial, Saleh’s family continues to hold many high-level positions throughout the government, business community and security forces. In fact, Saleh himself is still the head of the ruling General People’s Congress (GPC) party. Despite this fact, the transfer of power in the country has been turned into a ‘model’ and Obama even proposed the ‘Yemen model’ as a solution for the uprising in Syria.
Abd Rabbuh Mansur Al-Hadi struggled to consolidate his grip on power. After being elected as president in February 2012 Al-Hadi began efforts to weaken Saleh’s and his family’s grip on power. Hadi removed various military leaders loyal to Saleh, but the former president’s oldest son, Ahmed Ali Saleh, continues to serve as commander of the elite Republican Guard. Hadi attempted to unite the military and set up a 14-member military council to reform the armed forces. In August 2012 President Hadi’s announced a military restructuring designed to alter the balance of military power more in his favour. This battle with army factions is leading to Yemen’s tribes taking advantage of the power struggle by striking deals with competing interests in order to get the autonomy they have wanted. Today President Hadi is still a long way from meaningfully consolidating power. Without a clear, centralized power base in Sanaa, neither President Hadi nor anyone else has been able to meaningfully address security problems all over the country.
In this context a UN-backed reconciliation process began in November 2012 aimed at drafting a new constitution and preparing for full elections in February 2014. The National Dialogue Conference (NDC) was convened with representations from various political parties, major tribes, youth movements and delegates representing South and North Yemen. 565 delegates were tasked with developing recommendations on how to address nine issues ranging from future relations between the feuding north and south, to state-building to the future role of the army to rights and welfare — all of which were meant to go into the writing of a new constitution. September 2013 was recognized as the deadline for the major tasks to have been accomplished, but that date passed with little progress. Deep divisions began showing between all parties involved. Initially, the dialogue attempted to explore commonalities between delegates representing the ruling General People’s Congress (GPC) and the Joint Meeting Parties (JMP), representing the opposition. However, conflict soon ensued between members of the JMP themselves.
The people of Yemen rose up to remove a brutal dictator. The uprising saw the collapse of government institutions and the army as many defected. However real change did not take place in Yemen, only a transfer of power between one crony to another. The difference is the current crony has little power. Abd Rabboh Mansour Hadi has struggled to deliver on any of his promises. In the Al-Shari’ newspaper, in its 634th edition, issued on 8th October 2013, the paper published details of President Hadi’s discussions in two important military and security meetings held in September and October 2013. The newspaper mentioned a source who attended the meeting quoting Hadi, speaking to the military and security leaders that attended the meeting: “We all agree that the state has lost the ability to control and lost the ability to create security while it is infiltrated from within.” These remarks came amid Yemen suffering from the loss of security and an increase in murders and suicide cases due to the poor living and economic conditions. 3 years since the initial uprising, Yemen remains marred in chaos.
In summary the following observations can be made on the third anniversary of the Arab spring:
– In all the countries where rulers were overthrown or have struggled to maintain their grip, be it Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, Libya or Syria anarchy and chaos has replaced the initial euphoria. In both Tunisia and Egypt Islamic groups replaced previous regimes but have shown themselves to be incompetent when it came to ruling their respective nations. Most of the Middle East, despite possessing abundant energy resources, many have large young populations who remain unemployed and employment opportunities remain scarce. Economic underdevelopment, inflation and misdistribution of wealth continue to be normal in the region. Unable to solve these issues in any way led many to take to the streets again. There were also many elements in Egypt, Tunisia and Libya, who refused to accept the rule of Islamic groups and as a result kept a permanent stand off against the new regime going, in the case of Egypt leading to the collapse of the Muslim Brotherhood regime.
– In Egypt and Tunisia, voters in their millions clearly expressed their opposition to secular liberal values and their strong desire for Islamic government. Yet the same parties that went to great lengths to demonstrate their Islamic credentials to the masses in their election campaigns, these parties not only went to greater lengths to demonstrate their moderation to the West, but they abandoned Islamic rule. The political calculations of such groups are rooted in myths. They believe that an Islamic system can only be implemented gradually. Whilst the groups who have reached power lacked much in policy development they argued that Islamic solutions aren’t ready to deal with problems such as poverty, unemployment and development. They falsely believe implementing Islam will scare minorities, scare investors and scare the international community. In the case of the Muslim Brotherhood, they undermined Islam by making excuses for their own incompetence.
– The uprising in Syria continues to worry the West as most of the rebel groups have maintained their Islamic purity, despite numerous attempts to dilute this. The US invested in the Syrian National Coalition and despite changing its name a few times, its popularity remains in Washington, London and Paris rather than the cities and towns of Syria. The announcement of various groupings based on Islam in Syria and their control over large tracts of the country means Syria remains a work in progress. The Islamic aspect to this uprising continues to worry the West as the Ummah there are calling for real change rather than cosmetic change.
– What constitutes Islamic rule remains opaque in the minds of the people. The backlash against the MB in Egypt and Ennahda in Tunisia has been due to their inability to improve living standards, inflation and prosperity rather than their abandonment of Islam. Ennahda openly abandoned Islam whilst the MB in Egypt tried to justify their abandonment of Islam based on Islam only working if is is applied gradually. All of this indicates public opinion exists for change and also for Islam, but what this means, what shape and form this will take remains vague as a result liberal Islamic groups have been able to navigate around actually applying what they promised.
– The most salient feature of the Arab rising has been foreign interference. Although the initial uprisings in the region were by the people these were quickly hijacked by the West by propping up alternative groups, individuals and organisation to ensure real change didn’t take place. In Egypt after the fall of Mubarak the architecture that was loyal to the US remained intact and the MB made it perfectly clear they were not going to change the status quo such as the treaty with Israel and relations with the US. In Tunisia the army and the secular groups still maintain their position, even after Ben Ali was overthrown. In Syria the West continues to prop up the al-Assad regime by giving him cover through initiatives such as Geneva 2. The fundamental reason why the Arab spring has for the moment failed to reach its destined objective of real change is because the West wants to maintain the status quo.
At the start of 2014, aside from the Syrian uprising the others that took place have all ground to a halt as those who espoused Islam are in reality maintaining the pre-revolutionary systems. They are attempting to keep the West happy with their moderation and the people that voted them in happy by making cosmetic changes, whilst all the while keeping in place the secular systems and protecting Western interests.
In 2014 and beyond the following challenges will most likely occur:
– It should now be clear that Western intervention has not taken into account the demands of the region. This is why Western contact is with very specific individuals and groups who either espouse Western ideals or can be changed to espouse such ideals. The challenge for the Muslims of the region is to ensure its revolutions are not hijacked by a foreign agenda. The intervention by the West in Egypt and Libya was the key to Western infiltration of the revolutions. Through this it expects to have a say in the region.
– The biggest debate is the system of governance for the region. All calls for Islam are being hallowed out by a global media that would like to see Western values permeate the region. This pressure has led to many Islamic groups who suffered heavily by the regions dictators to compromise their Islamic polices in order to appease the West. Building a case for political Islam is a challenge the region will need to take up.
Adnan Khan
COMING SOON – STRATEGIC ESTIMATE 2014
Strategic Estimate 2014 is Khilafah.com’s fourth annual assessment of the global balance of power. We concluded our 2013 assessment with the US remaining the world’s superpower, facing a challenge in one region in the world by an assertive and aggressive China. Faced with this reality America’s pivot to the Asia-Pacific was taking shape in earnest as draw downs in both Afghanistan and Iraq were in full swing.
The rise of China with its rapid economic growth has been a regular feature of global politics for the last few decades. As part of our Strategic Estimates we have long questioned the sustainability of this rapid economic growth and in 2013 the unmistakable signs that China was trouble came to the surface. Many analysts in 2013 concluded China’s economic model has now run its course. Has China’s economic model run out of steam? Can China transition to another economic model? In Strategic Estimate 2014 we assess China’s prospects.
Ever since Vladimir Putin came to power and centralised Russia we have tracked Russia’s assertiveness in its region and beyond. Russia has been competing with the US to reverse the losses after the decade of the Soviet Union’s collapse. The reversal of the colour revolutions and more confident at home, Russia has been in an ideal position to challenge US prowess round the world. However, Russia’s response to US provocations against North Korea in February 2013 and Russian actions when al-Assad conducted a chemical attack in August 2013 were uncharacteristic of a global power and raise serious questions about Russia’s capability and ambitions. Strategic Estimate 2014 asses Russia’s position on these issues and analyses the nation’s military, energy, economic and social power.
The European Union continues in its struggle to navigate the myriad problems the global economic crisis has created. A variety of policies were analysed in Strategic Estimate 2013 which were applied during the year, these will be analysed to assess the EU’s current position. The political powers in Europe – Britain and France have had a busy year with their intervention in Mali. The position of both countries in terms of the global balance of power will be assessed in order to ascertain if they are any position to replace Russia and China as nations challenging the worlds Super Power – the US.
The role of ideology and values in global politics is this year’s geopolitical issue. Whilst economic and military power can be central to national power, values have for long played an important role in global power projection. The Cold war was the height of such an ideological clash and with the dominance of Capitalism the role values play in global politics is assessed.
Strategic Estimate 2014 is the author’s opinion and assessment of 2013 and the trends for 2014 and beyond. Like any assessment, they are estimates and forecasts.